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At the conlerence last year the view was expressed by Peter Gripaios that the world 
wide collapse 01 share price rellected a 'Iollow my leader' process which sucked in 
all countries, that a collapse 01 the Dow Jones Index was bound to allect the FT 
indexo Insolar as the 1973 collapse on Wall street was mirrored by a huge lall in 
the City 01 London lean even provide evldence consistent with that view. But it 
lacks commonsense. Share certificates are merely entitlements to a luture, 
uncertain, dividend stream and only when a common event threatens all income 
streams can they collapse in parallel. A new competitor in lertilisers will depress 
I.C.I. stock but will have only a very weak linkeage with that 01 United Biscuits. 
The 'October Crash' 01 1987 certainly disillusioned Prolessor Myers 01 MIT, a 
lormer strong advocate 01 efficient markets. He disowned the 'simple' elicient 
market hypothesis at an LSE conlerence on the crash (reported in the Financial 
Times 5th April1988, P14). 
I do not know what caused the crash. It would be very easy lor me to say the 
uncertainties 01 the time caused the market to discount the luture more het\\'ily 
(adopt a higher risk premlum) but this borders on tautology. What worries me more 
is the alternatlve views advanced. 
At the same conlerence a number 01 authors took positions at variance with ratlonal 
models. Lawrence Summers has argued that some investors engage In negative 
leedback and stabilise prlces whereas others have positive leedback and 
destabilise the system. The latter sometimes get the upper hand. Thls idea has 
been espoused by non-economists In the lorm 01 catastrophe theory back in 1973 
and resurfaced wlth Shiller's 1981 article in the American Economic Revlew. A less 
plausible and more mechanical model is not easy to imagine. Just as there are an 
Infinite number of straight lines that go through a polnt and an Infinite number of 
polynomials of degree 'n' that go through (n-1) polnts they do not provide an 
explanation. only one stralght line will go through two points and it is that sort of fit 
that is required to avoid the label ad hoc. 
IHE FUNpAMENIALlSI VIEW. 
Let us see how equities 'should' be valued. The constltuent companles 01 any of 
the FT Actuaries Indices generate a stream of dividends which must be compared 
with the earnings streams that can be obtained by Investing In more secure assets 
like government bonds. Assuming no risk aversion, If 10% can be obtained on 
'long' bonds then 10% wlll be required on equlties. The value 01 a share will then 
be equal to the net present value 01 the future dividend stream discounted at 10%. 
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II there is no growth in the dividends then 
01 = 02 = 03 = ................ =D 
and P = O/R. 
II D Is growing at arate 'g' then P = O/(R-g). 
In :steady state then dividends will grow at arate 'g' and so 
must the price If the dividend yield, O/P, plus 'g' is to remain 
equal to tlle yield on bonds. 
Putting this another way the condition tor being indifferent between 
bonds and equities is tha! 
R - 9 = O/P . 
Or R = O/P + g. 
ARBITRAGE ANO BULL MARKETS. 
Ignoring property, works 01 art and loreign securities where similar considerations 
apply a portlollo manager has the choice 01 putting money into short term lunds on 
a rollover basis, putting money into long term bonds and putting money into the 
equity market. Hicks delineated the linkeage between the lirst two with his 
expectations theory - the long run rate being a geometric average 01 luture one 
year rates. Our simple arbitrage condition applles equally well lor the decision to 
switch into or out 01 the equity market Irom shorts or longs. The portlollo manager 
will constantly raview the yield on equity over 1 year and inlinite horizons and 
compara with the known redemption yields 01 1 year gilts and irredeemables 
respectively. 
Remember ( D/P + 9 ) represents the expected return on aquity and it must be 
equated to the readily available gross redemption yield on bonds lor the same time 
horizon. ie it must hold lor a three month view (taking tha yiald on traasury bilis as 
the comparator) and into the inlinite luture (taking the flat yield on consols lor 
comparison). 
Let (dP/P)s and (dP/P)L represent axpectad capital gains over 1 year and live year 
horizons respectively. 
Let RS and RL be the current gross redemptlon yields on one and live year bonds. 
It lollows that two relationships must hold simultaneously: 
[1] 
[2] 
and hence that 
O/P + (dP/P)s = Rs 
O/P + (dP/P)L = RL (dP/P)L = (dP/P)s + RL - Rs 
In steady state the index should grow at a constant rate but il short rates rose lor 
one year above long ratas than short run growth in the index must exceed long run 
growth. This would take the form 01 a collapse in the share price now to equalise 
yialds. The rebound 01 the share price Is presumably the only so lid interpretation 
Equity Plicing: How reasonable arelnvestors? EricDyke Page2 
that can be given to the idea of a 'bull' market. Otherwise a bull market can only be 
more loosely ascribed to a rising share price in the face of a string of good news, 
Iike throwing two sixes on three consecutive throws of a pair of dice. 
At any moment in time portfolio managers will not only be interested in in the 
Indefinite yield on equities relative to the indefinite yield on gilts. They will also be 
interested in the 1 year holding return on them both. 
Thus if interest rates were anticipated to be 10% into the indefinlte future, 'g' was 
anUcipated to be 1 % and 'D' =10, then the market price would be 111.1. But if the 
raté of interest unexpectedly rose for one year to 20% (a BOP crisis, an inflationary 
scare) then the market price would have to fall by 9.16% (to 100.916) in order to 
equalise returns. [D/P will then be 9.90923% and expected capital gain for the year 
will be (111.1-100.916)/100.916 = 10.09156%. Thls makes the total 20% for the 
year, whlch It must be to compare with 1 yr returns. 
Quite dramatic 'overshooting' can occur where unexpected pollcy change takes 
place even when the future flow of dividends Is expected to remain unchanged. 
The effect would be greater if companies had to roll over their debts on a short term 
basis for then the higher interest rate would hit firms profits as well as lowering the 
present value of any glven future dividends. 
Of course expectations of future interest rate rises are embodied In the yield curve 
and when they unfold the market price should not be affected. Even a large blip 
forseen in 5 years time should not affect the share price much now and not at all 
when it comes. Bu' a sustained anticipated blip would make a sizeable difference 
now, with one im; ortant exception. In particular a 'rising yleld curve not only 
expresses a belief in rising interest rates but also In a higher level of inflation In the 
future. If held with confidence the sudden expectation of hlgher Inflation In the 
future should not affect the level of share prices today, even though it will affect 
long term bond prices. Gross redemption yields on bonds should rise as bond 
Investors seek the same real returns as before but in the case of equlties we would 
expect dividends to rise with Inflation and so their expected return rises with the 
inflationary expectations without any need for an adjustment In their own current 
dlvidend yield. The difference (GRY on longs - D/P) reflects 'g' as befo re but it has 
both a real and an Inflation expectation componen!. We cannot simply look at it and 
say that the gap is hlstorically high and stock prices are 'obviously' overvalued. The 
Bank of England, In it's post-crash Quarterly Bulletin, and a number of articles in 
the 'Economist' all drew attention to the 'extraordinary' reverse yield gap wlth the 
implication that investors had pushed equitles too high. If such readily available 
informatlon had su eh an obvious meaning the reverse yield gap would not fluctuate 
as it has. 
Similarly with exchange rates. A long run decline maintainlng purchasing power 
parity would not alfect the stock market even though some 45% of earnlngs for UK 
companles currently come from abroad. However 'unexpected' changes In 
government policy would have a prolound elfec!. The point 1 am making Is that 
dividend yields and gross redemption yields should move together only in 
response to unexpected changes in pollcy (both those 01 our own government and 
of other governments in a world of high capital mobility). Just as the volatility of 
exchange rates owes les s , In my view to the capricious behaviour 01 speculators 
so the capricious behavior of the stock market owes less to the 'Iads' 01 market 
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operators than it does to the unpredictable nature 01 policy and the existence 01 
genuinely unlorecastable events. 
In another guise our lundamental equation is the lamiliar interest rate parity 
condition that holds continuously on the loreign exchanges. 
R UK = RUSA + dElE 
BO!h are arbitrage relatlonships, one between bonds and equltles 
over ea eh time horlzon and the other between bank deposits In 
different eurreneles at a polnt In time .. It Is now a eommonplaee to 
refer to exehange rates as behavlng IIke equities In thelr volatile 
behavlour. Indeed the eoneept of 'overshooting' was long reeognlsed 
among partieipants 01 bond and equlty markets long befo re it was born 
In the maeroeeonomles literature. 
INVESTORS ANO SPECULATORS. 
Standard texts In linance suggest there exists two sorts 01 operators in the second 
hand market lor linancial assets - Investors and speculators. The lormer care only 
lor dividends the lalter for short run capital gains. The standing 01 the lalter is 
enhanced by the writings 01 Keynes (by the now dated speculative demand lor 
money at one level, more popularly by the tale 01 the beauty contest). 
"Or to change the metaphor slightly, prolessional investment may be 
likened to those newspaper competitions In which competitors have 
to pick out the slx prettiest laces from a hundred photographs, the 
prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly 
corresponds to the average prelerences 01 the competitors as a 
whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he 
himsell linds prettiest, but those which he thinks likliest to catch the 
lancy 01 the other competitors, all 01 whom are looking at the 
problem Irom the same point 01 view. It is not a case 01 choosing 
those which, to the best of one's judgement, are really the prettiest, 
nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the preltiest. 
We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the 
average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice 
the lourth, lilth and higher degrees." 
(The General Theory, P156). 
Specilically Keynes drew the distinction between 'speculation', by which he meant 
the activity of foreeasting the psyehology 01 the market and 'enterprise', the activity 
of forecasting the prospective yleld of stockmarket assets. 
But fundamental analysis encompasses both points 01 view. Starting from the 
fundamental equation favoured by investors it is easy to derive the equation 
ascribed to speculators and vice versa. 
Some people hold equities for a long time - some buy and sell over a short time 
horizon. So do holders of building society accountsl Are there any intrinsic 
diflerences? The lalter are more secure so people holding them may be more risk 
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averse but it is not obvious that we can differentiate between short term and long 
term holders 01 any particular asset. Both are alter yield. The composition 01 the 
yield differs as between securities. Short term buyers incur more transaction costs 
but they may merely be putting thelr savings to good use lor the period belore they 
need to spend. 
The concept 01 'short termism' amounts to saving that the stock market 
lundamentally values equities at below their net worth. In the extreme case the 
purchaser cares only lor the dividends accruing in one years time and his expected 
res,ale price when the stock goes 'ex div'. But 01 course, even il there are no long 
term Investors, our speculator knows that the market price in one years time must 
rellect the value then 01 dividends accruing one year lurther on and its associated 
ex div price. A rational view, even In a musical chalrs market, must rellect the entire 
luture stream 01 dividends. 
LET Po BE VALUE TO A SPECULATOR. 
LET D1 BE THE EXPECTED DIVIDEND IN 1YR. 
LET P1 BE THE EXPECTED PRICE IN ONE YEARS TIME. 
LET 'R' BE THE REDEMPTION YIELD ON A ONE YEAR GILT (and hence the 
required equity yield slnce we are, lor the moment still taking the risk premium as 
zero). 
Po = [ 0 1 + P1]/[1 +R] 
Po + RPo = Do + P1 
R = Do/Po + [P1 -Po]/Po 
The speculator therefore equates the safe bond yleld to the 
prospectlve dividend yleld plus expected capital galn. Since pursult of 
easy money popularly distingulshes speculators from Investors It 
would seem that the aboye behaviour characterlses speculative 
activlty but it also of course captures Investors behavior. 
Since 
It follows that 
Po = [01 ]/[1 +R] + [ O2 ]/[1 +R]2 + [ P2 ]/[1 +R]2 + ........ 
01 course tax considerations have dictated that some Investors be capital gains 
seeking rather than divldend seeking. Thls presumably accounts lor much 01 the 
'churning' 01 stocks and bonds. 'Bond washlng' may be iIIegal but It is undoubtedly 
attractlve where differential taxation and low transactions costs coexlst. Such 
activlty though should not invite the charge 01 short termlsm. Nor should any 
prelerence lor more risky, non 'Blue Chip', stocks since the division between 
returns In the form 01 Income and of capital gain has olten influenced portfollo 
choice even between risk neutral individuals. 
This Is not to say that equities will not be discounted heavily. The quallty 01 their 
earnings is obviously less secure than on gilts because 01 various market risks and 
the possibillty 01 bankruptcy. Equally bonds differ in their delault risks and 'short 
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and longs' in their capital and income risks. So me risk premium will be added but it 
is not obvious that more distant earnings should be discounted at a higher rate 
than nearer ones for the same security. 
The main limitation of the 'short termism view' is the lack of any anchor for expected 
price change other than that provided firmly by fundamental analysis. 
PERFECT FORESIGHT MODEL. 
Knowing all future one year rates of interest on government debt and all future 
dividends we can work out a rational price for a share, or indeed the FT index and 
the subsequent evolution of that price. 
Going back 30 years we can see this reasonably. Going back three years to 1985 
there is a problem since most of the value then will depend upon future rates of 
dividends and inlerest beyond the present. Market operators must work these out 
but this is of no concern to Lis here. If they guess correctly the FT index will go on a 
'random walk' as it Is hit by 'news'. What we can do Is, assuming it is right now 
(and if you believe it is obviously to high/low you sell/buy) we can use the current 
price as the terminal price and evaluate 
where the R's denote 1 yr bond rates. 
Thls generates a synthetic 'rational' price series which may be compared with the 
actual one to give a measure of surprises as time rolled on. Since expected 
inflation should affect both numerator and denominator equally only unexpected 
changes in real profitabllity, Inflation and government policy should affect the share 
price. 
Shiller did this for the United States and it has recently been done for the UK. In 
both cases real divldends were discounted by a constant discount rate. The actual 
index, unlike the rational one, has been found to fluctuate far more than can be 
justified by subsequent changes in dividends. 
THE EXPECTED RETURN FROM EQUITV. 
By assuming perfect foreslght we can find the successive expected returns on 
equity. This is slmply the Internal rate of return, the interest rate that equates the 
future dividend stream and terminal price to the market value In each year. I have 
calculated these for the period 1963 to 1988 and graph them against the gross 
redemption yield on 20 year bonds. The difference represents the risk premium 
demanded by Investors. With perfect foresight of course a premium would not be 
demandedl 
As a practical maller the future looks cloudier the further you loo k into it. The 
prospective dividend is somewhat less of a problem than ascertainlng its path in 
future years or ilS growth rate. This is quite familiar to economists and it is not 
surprising that rules of thumb develop to meet il. 
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'Buy in May - sell on St Swithans Day'. 
'October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to speculate 
In stocks'. Mark Twain. (Untortunately no simple rule is suggested 
here - 11 others are also named). 
My own experience was that for individual stocks analysts tried to forecast earnings 
(and hence dividends if the payout ratio Is constant) for the next three years and 
then assumed that earnings growth followed that of the market as a whole. 
Earnings growth was always a multiple of 5% for that three year periodl I knew the 
arb[trage condition as the 'POLlCY EQUATION' and earnings growth was forecast 
by fitting an equation of the form: 
Et = (1 + g)tEo 
by least squares to data for the prevlous twenty years. Thls was our estimate which 
was then modified by considering the range of estimates oftered by reputable 
research departments through whose companies we dealt. This produced a value 
for 'g' of 4.19% and one of my first jobs on a monday morning would be to employ 
the 'policy equation' uslng this figure, the current flat yield on consols and the 
historical dividend yleld to decide how new monies were to be allocated that week. 
(The allocation was complicated by having substantial alternative outlets in 
property development - back of the envelope was an exaggeration for the 
calculations that went Into Brent Cross - and speculative activity in overseas 
securities, primarily American). Of course 4.19% takes on the attribute of a magic 
number and one may question whether it was optimistlc. My own contribution was 
to point out that such growth In a non inflationary world would cause a most 
improbable shift in the functional distribution of Income and that It was too high. The 
consensus vlew was that the last twenty years contained enough variety of 
experience for one to feel that the next twenty years was unlikely to produce any 
significant change in earnings per share growth. A nagging doubt still remained 
that only with a fairly detalled assessment and balanclng out of all the factors that 
affect 'g' could we assess the IIklihood that the past would repeat Itself. 
Team members were strongly of the opinion that in the long run equity earnings 
(and associated dlvidends) would at least keep up with inflation since real assets 
producing real goods should maintain their real value. Furthermore that earnings 
per share ought to do better than Inflation to the extent that there is real growth. 
So the growth rate of dividends in the long run can be found by comblning an 
estimate of future inflatlon with an estlmate of real growth. Although the historical fit 
won In 1971, l shall use thls more satisfactory method in calculating returns to 
equlty and the associated risk premlums. 
Some team members were 'cyclists' (indeed one was a 4:1 cyclist bear at the time 
and another was a 2:1 non-cyclist bulll) which raises question of the suitable 
beguinning and end dates for the regresslon. 
Personally l was a non-cycllng athelst at the time havlng sought the philosophers 
stone in Harvard Finance Journals and found the "Efficlent Market Hypothesls" 
instead. However the Pollcy Equation did tell me that equlties were the wrong 
place to be in 1971 and my reservations about 9 = 4.19% reinforced this. The FT 
indices feH precipitously over the next few years, much more so in real terms. It was 
said that the markets discounted everythlng except all out nuclear war. 
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Thls should have shaken my beliel In efliclent markets but the lall was preclpltated 
on a world level by the Ilrst OPEe shock and the ensulng slowdown in growth. 
Domestically it was reinlorced by the secondary banking crisis. Neither 01 these 
events were lorseeable in 1971 so I did not really outguess the market. We were all 
in the dark and a sharp correction in prices was quite rational in view 01 the new 
circumstances, though my results may suggest that the trough 01 December 1974 in 
the Index was unreasonably low. 
THE EQUITV RISK PREMIUM. 
I will start off with the view that bonds and equities are very close substitutes. A 
characteristic 01 perfect substitutes, in asset markets at least, is that the ylelds on 
them should move in a 'Iocked step' lashion. Whllst expectations that people have 
about luture short term interest rates can be 'read' Irom the yield curve 
expectations 01. luture .dividend growth are less visible, as is the required yield on 
equity. By making assumptions lirst 01 perfect loresight and then 01 extreme myopia 
about the luture course 01 divldends we can derive an expected yield on equity 
and compare this with the known yield on bonds. Then we might take a more 
intermediate view, which coincides with typical practice among analysts. 
The dividend series was constructed by multiplying the June dividend yield by the 
June market price for each year. Since the dividends embedded in the dividend 
yield figure rellect the dividends lor the previous four quarters I treated them as 
belng paid exactly 6 months prevlously. In the calculations that lollow I use the 
January prices for each year, treating the index as a price for a composite stock that 
goes ex dividend on December 31st. The next dividend accrues in 1 yrs time. 
The monthly prices are in fact an average 01 the closing jobbers price for each 
wednesday 01 the month. As with all arbitrage relationships it would be ideal to 
have prices on a specific day for both the index and gross redemption yields as 
well as a more factual basis for the distribution 01 dividend payments about the 
year. 
MODEL 1 
By assuming perfect foresight we can lind the return on equity demanded by 
investors. Knowing all dividends that will accrue from 1963 to 1988 and the 
terminal price in 1988 investors wlll fix a price In 1963 that will provide their 
requlred return. Since we know the price that was set we can calculate what that 
return was. It is simply the internal rate 01 return derived from the following 
equatlon:-
1988 
P63= L 01/(1 +R)t-1962 + Paa /(1 +R)26 
t=1963 
This can be done for 1964, 1965 etc to date and compared to the yield on 
longs. The difference is a measure 01 the risk premium. This is the Shiller 
approach, in reverse as it were, and I have labelled it 'modeI1'. 
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MODEL 2 and MODEL3 
Alternatively we can take the 'mypopic' view that investors assume the present will 
be much like the pas!. They know last years dividend and expect it to grow at arate 
'g' where 'g' is the long run growth rate 01 the economy as gleaned Irom historical 
data. For this I use the magic 4.19 % ligure and label this 'model 2'. 
For 'model 3' I have taken long run growth as being expected real growth in the 
economy plus expected inllation. The level 01 inllation expected Into the luture is 
gleaned Irom bond market operators. Remember it is only the valuation 01 equities 
relátive to gilts with which we are concerned. The approach rests on three 
foundations. 
[1) In the long run dividends cannot grow faster than money GDP. 
(2) The real interest rate does not vary In the long run (Iooking 
forward that is, actual real rates can vary quite a lot) so the 
nominal yield on bonds minus this rate gives us an estimate 01 
luture inflation. I take the real interest rate to be 3%. 
[3] Long run real growth lor the UK economy is 2.5% 
[2] and [3) in particular may be termed heroico But in lact it is only the difference 
between real interest rates and real growth that matters, not their absolute 
magnitudes. 
Since we are deaiing with historic dividends the correct valuation equation is , for 
1963, 
Again we can do this lor the next 26 years and calculate required returns and 
compare them to the known yields to redemption on twenty year bonds lor each 
date to 1988. 
MODEL 4 
I call these approaches myopic because they have no Inlormation which would 
indicate the level 01 specific dividends in the future. Finally we can apply a more 
sophisticated version. Analysts have lots 01 information pertaining to the near 
future, although the constraints applied in [1), [2] and [3] aboye might be the only 
guide to the distant future. 
They will typlcally take a consldered view 01 earnings for an individual share over a 
time horizon of say three years and then assume that growth continues as defined 
by 'g' aboye. If we now assume that on average the markets estimate 01 dividends 
over the next three years Is correct we can calculate the required yleld on equity by 
solvlng for 'R' In an equation of the form 
Po= 0 1/(1 +R) + O2/(1 +R)2 + Z /(1 +R)3 
where Z = 03r 1 +(1 +g)/(R-g)] 
Thls I have labelled 'model 4'. 
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From the difterent data requirements of these models and the readily available 
information to hand l was able to calculate expected returns from: 
model1 for 1963 to 1987 inclusive 
model 2 for 1964 to 1988 inclusive 
model 3 for 1964 to 1988 inclusive 
model 4 for 1963 to 1985 inclusive. 
Models 2 and 3 could be solved quite easily and hence the spurious precision 
given in the results. Models 1 and 4 were solved by an iterative search for roots 
over an economically reasonable range (O to 50%). Model 1 returns were 
calculated to only the nearest 1/2% because l did not expect very sensible results. 
Model 4 was calculated to 2 decimal points, as is normal practice with bond yields. 
RESUL TS. 
These l have shown in graphical form but l will make brief observations. 
MODEL 1 
The calculated equity premium is far too volatile to be reasonable. Either the 
premium required or the perceptions of future dividends fluctuates considerably. 
The approach do es have merit in reminding us that in the long run equity does 
provide a higher return than does bonds. 
Note that E(R) = b + m 
But for any particular year: 
where E(R) represents expected equity 
yield 
'b' represents GRY on 20 yr bonds. 
'm' represents the risk premium. 
Ractual = b + m + e 
where 'e' represents a stochastic shock. 
If all returns were in the form of equity growth then: 
So that P3 = Po eRO e R1 e R2 
= Po e[RO+R1+R21 
P1= Po eRO 
P2= P1 eR1 
P3= P2 eR2 
The exponent is then (bo+ b1 + b2+ mo+ m1 + m2+ 60+ 61 + 62 ). If bond yields 
are unchanged and and the e's are independent of each other then the longer the 
run considered the closer the actual return approxlmates the required yield. The 
variability in my model 1 risk premium can reflect a number of these things. Not 
surprisingly perhaps the assumption of perfect foresight has lead to a view that 
inveslors are unreasonable. Note the correlation coefficient between expected 
return and gross redemption yield on 20 yr bonds is 0.817. Because the run of 
years over whlch yields are calculated is decreasing, the more recent the 
calculation the less likely are the errors to cancel out. Thus the variance in the risk 
premium appears lo be increasing over time. 
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MOOEL 2 
Here we have the case 01 extreme myopia and investor behaviour is again quite 
unreasonable. The risk premium nonsensibly turns negative quite early on. Either 
investors have not done their sums in this way (obviously) or they appear willing to 
accept a loss 01 return by holding equities rather than gilts. Risk - seeking 
behavlour might be invoked here but the variability 01 the risk premium makes this 
an ad hoc explanation - quite apart lrom the well established lact that over long 
perJods 01 time equities do yield appreciably more than bonds. I see no reason lor 
a revolutionary change In attitudes by investors In 1969. Similar results would have 
been found lor any fixed 'g'. Agaln it is the model that is unreasonable and not the 
underlylng behavior 01 investors. 
MOOEL 3 
Here we take quite Iimited inlomatlon by Investors but it is flrmly grounded in It's 
long run assumptions regarding dividend growth. It splits this up into real and 
expected inllation components. The correlation coefficient between expected 
equity and 20 yr bond returns moves up to 0.96. This reinlorces my beliel in the 
reasonableness 01 investors and 01 my assumptions. This includes the one about 
the hlgh degree 01 sUbstitutabiljty between bonds and equities. The correlation 
coefficient 01 0.66 lor model 2 would otherwise have cast doubt on this. 
MOPEL 4 
The market is widely thought 01 as a leading ind :ator 01 the real economy with a 
lead time 01 6 - 18 months. I was surprised then tL)\ by making the assumption that 
it could 'see' dlvidends three years hence ( my proxy lor it being able to make 
unbiased predictions) that the excessive risk premium 01 January 1975 should still 
remain stubbornly high at 11.28%. 
01 course the next logical step would be to develop a model 5 In which real growth 
itsell was a variable. Notably productivity growth dipped below 1 % over the period 
1973 - 1980 and since I have taken real growth as a constant the risk premium 
residually plcks up this error. It would have been rational for market participants to 
downgrade growth lor a while in a period 01 lollowing a rapid rise in oil prices and 
so the higher plateau lor the risk premium Is consistent with reasonable behaviour. 
Unlortunately the very hlgh ligure lor 1975 Is also consistent with panlc - as 
evidenced by the strong bounce back 01 the market in the subsequent couple 01 
months. 
However a word 01 caution is required In interpreting these results. A variation 01 
even 1% in the risk premilim is not to be taken Iightly. 1I 'g', the bond yleld and the 
risk premium are each 5% and the prospective dividend is 5 then the current price 
willbe100. II the premium rose to 6% then the price would lall to 83.33, a decline 
01 16.66%. Ultimately we are down to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principie and 
what Wallich relers to as 'radical revisions 01 the distant luture'. 
The value 01 stock depends very heavily (via an obvious multiplier) on the 
anticipated growth rate 01 dividends and the required yield on equity. 
Equity Pricing: HO\\' reasonable are investolll? Eñe Dyke Paga 11 
CONCLUplNG COMMENT. 
Dr Alexandra of Exeter University disturblngly suggested that a concomitant of a 
random walk is a random set of footprints in the snow if one looks behind. This is 
my interpretation and it must be said that she argued that the inability to explain the 
crash of 1987 was itself supportive of market efficiency. But failure to predict 
because of an inability to forecast 'news' is hardly to deny the ability to explain 
when that news Is now historyl If our civilisation should be obliterated and some 
distant archeologist should uncover a series of price - earnings ratios as our only 
remain I hope he will treat it akin to how a biologist would treat the thickness of tree 
rings-not as so me haphazard pattern but representing a measure of confidence in 
the future, reasonably based. 
In the 1960's it's fair to say that adaptive expectations, monsters, money illusion 
and witches roamed the economic landscape. But in the new era of rational 
expectations I find it difficult to accept the way these concepts are pulied out again 
to explain share prices. 
Eqully Pnclng: How re.sonable are Investors? Ene Dyke Pago 12 
REQurRED EQfJITY RETUR!'JS, % RISK PRE!-1It1·1, %. 
Re ... YEAR GRY2J MOOEL1 NCOEL2 MOOEL3 NOOEL4 MODEL1 MOCEL2 !-10D E:" 3 ~DDEL4 
1 1963 5.34 13.5 * * 10.20 8.16 * * 4.86 
2 1964 5.53 13.0 8.8536 9.7972 9.70 7.47 3.32362 4.2672 4.17 
3 1965 6.18 14.0 9.7876 11.4415 10.65 7.82 3.60763 5.2615 4.47 
4 1966 6.53 14.5 9.6358 11. 6648 10.95 7.97 3.10579 5.1348 4.~2 
5 1967 6.73 16.0 9.9715 12.2230 11.80 9.27 3.24146 5.4930 5.07 
6 1968 7.26 15.0 8.7150 11. 5076 11.20 7.74 1.45498 4.2476 3.94 
7 1969 8.36 12.5 7.5622 11.4893 11. 20 4.14 -0.79783 3.1293 2.84 
8 1970 9.03 14.5 8.2969 12.9646 12.65 5.47 -0.73315 3.9346 3.62 
9 1971 9.51 16.5 8.8376 14.0426 13.90 6.99 -0.67238 4.5326 4.39 
10 1972 7.93 14.0 7.6815 11.1574 11 .20 6.07 -0.24847 3.2274 3.27 
11 1973 9.56 14.0 7.6691 12.8711 12.85 4.44 -1. 89091 3.3111 3.29 
12 1974 12.89 19.5 9.7413 18.6386 18.30 6.61 -3.14871 5. ~496 5.41 
13 1975 16.02 29.5 15.3648 28.2704 27.30 13.48 -0.65518 12.2504 11. 28 
14 1976 13.79 21. o 9.9004 19.7837 19.80 7.21 -3.88955 5.993" 6.01 
15 1977 14.48 23.5 10.9959 21.7310 22.40 9.02 -3.48415 7.2510 7.92 
16 1978 11. 06 21. 5 10.0298 16.9697 17.70 10.44 -1.03017 5.9097 6.64 
17 1979 13.68 23.0 10.4155 20.2256 20.30 9.32 -3.26451 6.5456 6.62 
18 1980 14.17 24.0 11.6261 22.0818 20.70 9.83 -2.54390 7.9118 6.53 
19 1981 13.96 24.0 10.8024 20.9522 20.20 10.04 -3.15755 6.9922 6.24 
20 1982 15.58 25.0 10.6764 22.5783 22.20 9.42 -4.90359 6.9983 6.62 
21 1983 11. 60 24.0 9.7389 17.2432 17.70 12.40 -1. 86115 5.6432 6.10 
22 1984 10.28 22.0 9.2016 15.2511 15.80 11.72 -1.07840 4.9711 5.52 
23 1 : ~ 5 10.96 19.5 9.1112 15.8857 16.00 8.54' -1. 84882 4.9257 5.04 
24 10.80 20.5 8.9732 15.5676 * 9.70 -1. 82677 4.7676 * 
25 ¡ , 10.09 7.0 8.3226 14 .1210 * -3.09 -1. 76738 4.0310 * 
26 1" o _N 9.57 * 8.7798 14.0462 * * -0.79018 4.4~62 * 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF MODEL EQUITY RETURNS 
------------------------------------------
ANO GROSS REDEMPTION YIELO ON 20 YR BONOS. 
------------------------------------------
GRY20 MODEL1 NODEL2 MODEL3 
1·IOD EL 1 0.817 
MODEL2 0.660 0.782 
MODEL3 0.959 0.871 0.845 
MODEL4 0.969 0.958 0.814 0.994 
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